This article considers the implications -for functional anatomy -of how we represent temporal structure in our exchanges with the world. It offers a theoretical treatment that tries to make sense of the architectural principles seen in mammalian brains. Specifically, it considers a factorisation between representations of temporal succession and representations of content or, heuristically, a segregation into when and what. This segregation may explain the central role of the hippocampus in neuronal hierarchies, while providing a tentative explanation for recent observations of how ordinal sequences are encoded. The implications for neuroanatomy and physiology may have something important to say about how selforganized cell assembly sequences enable the brain to exhibit purposeful behaviour that transcends the here and now. 
The principles of functional anatomy
There are certain architectural principles of neuroanatomy that seem amenable to explanation from a purely theoretical perspective. These range from the existence of axonal processes that form neuronal connections, through to macroscopic organisational principles such as functional segregation [1] . A key example is the segregation of dorsal and ventral streams into what and where streams [2] . How might these architectural features be explained from a theoretical perspective? In what follows, we appeal to active inference and the Bayesian brain hypothesis [3, 4] to show that functional segregation is mandated for brains that navigate a world with deep hierarchical structure. We then consider the implications of this argument for a fundamental aspect of this navigation; namely, the trajectories or ordered sequences of states we encounter [5] . Our conclusion is that there should be a functional segregation between what and when -a conclusion that seems to explain a number of anatomical and physiological observations; particularly in the hippocampal system.
Good enough brains and good enough models
A key theoretical development in neurobiology is the appreciation of the brain as a predictive organ -generating predictions of its actions and sensations [4, [6] [7] [8] [9] . These predictions rest on an internal or generative model of how sensory input unfolds. Indeed, one can understand much of neuronal dynamics and synaptic plasticity as an optimisation of (Bayesian) model evidence -as scored by proxies like free energy and prediction errors [9] [10] [11] . If one subscribes to this normative theory, the brain must be a good (enough) model of its environment, where recurring sequences of events are the rule. This is an old idea, dating back to notions of good regulators in self-organisation and cybernetics [12, 13] . In brief, the good regulator theorem states that any system that can control its environment must be a good model of that environment. So what constitutes a good enough model?
Mathematically, a good enough model is simply a model that has high evidence, in light of the (sensory) data it has to explain. Evidence is the probability of sensory samples, under a model of how those samples were generated (See Box 1). In this sense, any brain can be understood as (self) organising itself to maximise model evidence. Here, we are implicitly appealing to the Bayesian brain hypothesis [14] , while gently sidestepping big questions about its utility and falsifiability: e.g., [15, 16] . In what follows, we assume that the imperative to maximise model evidence is a truism and consider the implications for functional anatomy. Our focus is not on the Bayesian brain per se but on the notion of a mean field approximation that is an integral part of approximate Bayesian inference.
A key conclusion -that follows from the Bayesian brain -is that the structure of a good brain will recapitulate the (statistical) structure of how sensations are caused. A simple but remarkable example is the very existence of neuronal connections. Why does the brain have connections, while the liver seems to operate perfectly happy without them? The answer to this is almost obvious when we consider that the brain has to model sparse dependences induced by causal structure in the world. In other words, a good enough (or sufficient) explanation for our sensory inputs is that they are generated by a small number of underlying causes that act upon each other (usually at a distance), in a lawful and structured way. This lawful structure requires a relatively sparse dependency among the causes; such as gravity causing things to fall or visual objects causing sensory impressions. In short, the causal structure of our world should, in principle, provide a sufficient explanation for the structure and fabric of any brain that is trying to model that world. One could apply this argument to other aspects of neuronal architecture. For example, our sensations are generated in a way that conforms to logarithmic rules (e.g., Weber's law). These statistical rules may then be transcribed into the lognormal statistics of synaptic physiology [17] or the connectome that supports this physiology [18] . Simply noting that causal regularities in the world are transcribed into neuronal architectures is interesting (and perhaps self-evident). However, this conjecture does not get to the heart of principles such as functional segregation. To understand how maximising model evidence leads to functional segregation, we have to consider the constraints under which evidence is optimised. This brings us to the notion of approximate Bayesian inference (Box 1).
Box 1 about here

Good enough brains and approximate Bayesian inference
Any system or procedure that optimises (maximises) Bayesian model evidence can be regarded as implementing Bayesian inference. However, exact Bayesian inference is generally impossible in the real world; especially when modelling data generated by hierarchically deep, dynamic and nonlinear processes. Almost invariably, this problem is solved with something called approximate Bayesian inference. Approximate Bayesian inference refers to optimisation in which an approximate representation (technically, a posterior probability distribution or 'belief') is made as similar as possible to the exact (Bayes-optimal) belief. There are many examples of approximate Bayesian inference. One popular example is Bayesian filtering (a.k.a. predictive coding [11] ) that calls on a number of approximations. These include the assumption that probabilistic beliefs have a particular distributional form (usually a Gaussian or bell shaped distribution). Another important assumption -that is ubiquitous in statistical physics and data analysis -is referred to as a mean field approximation [19, 20] . Combining these two approximations leads to something called variational Bayes. The mathematical details here are unimportant -the key concept is that the brain is faced with an important choice in the way that it optimises the very structure of its generative model (the fabric of its connections) and associated beliefs (the physiology supported by this fabric).
Put simply, the mean field approximation approximates dependencies among multiple factors with a product of marginal distributions that is much easier to deal with -in terms of encoding and updating. A key challenge for approximate Bayesian inference is to find the right factorisation or marginalisation of beliefs about the causes of sensory input. Each possible factorisation or marginal representation corresponds to a different mean field approximation and a different way of 'carving nature at its joints' [21, 22] . As scientists, we use this judicious 'carving' whenever we design a factorial experiment and test for interactions. In this case, the two factors represent a parsimonious hypothesis about how our data are caused, where the interaction reflects how one factor influences the expression of the other. Can this basic tenet of good statistical modelling be applied to neurobiology?
There are two levels that immediately come to mind. The first is the perspective afforded by the Bayesian brain -and, in particular, the notion of perception as hypothesis testing [7] . In this instance, efficient perceptual synthesis reduces to an efficient and good factorisation of the putative causes of sensations. In other words, the brain has to learn about statistical independencies (technically, conditional independencies) to properly approximate the underlying causes of the sensorium. There is ample evidence to suggest that experiencedependent plasticity and associated learning plays a huge role in this process [23] . However, one can also regard evolution as playing exactly the same game: it is becoming increasingly evident that evolution can be formulated as learning statistical structure in the environment and distilling that structure into the phenotype [24] [25] [26] . Indeed, formal treatments of replicator dynamics and Fisher's fundamental theorem demonstrate that these evolutionary processes are nothing more or less than Bayesian belief updating. Indeed, natural selection itself has been likened to Bayesian model selection, where adaptive fitness corresponds to (variational) free energy [9, 27] .
Functional segregation and carving nature at its joints
The second level at which a good (enough) factorisation might be expressed is in terms of functional anatomy and segregation. In short, millennia of evolutionary (Bayesian belief)
updates have shaped the brain into an efficient (minimum free energy) mean field approximation that we know and study as functional segregation [1, 28, 29] .
A compelling example -of the implicit division of labour -is the factorisation of syntax and lexico-semantic statistics of language [30] . Ample evidence demonstrates that Brodmann areas 45 and 47 respond not only to natural sentences in fMRI experiments but also to grammatically correct sentences without semantic content or meaning. This suggests a specialised role of these brain areas in syntactical organization of semantic information [31] .
In contrast, several other neocortical areas respond selectively to meaningful sentences but not to grammatically correct sentences without semantic information [32] .
Perhaps the most celebrated example of transcribing statistical independencies into neuroanatomy is the segregation of dorsal and ventral visual processing streams [2, 33, 34] .
The argument here is straightforward: if the causes of our visual sensations are visual objects that can be in different positions, the optimal way to factorise these causes is into where an of what and where. The predictions of current sensations then involve multiplying the probability distribution over where an object is by the probability distribution over what an object is (we will return to the importance of this multiplication or interaction later). One could take this sort of argument much further, in terms of hierarchal representations and special cases of variational inference cast in terms of information theory; leading to the principle of minimum redundancy, the principle of maximum efficiency, imperatives for sparse coding and so on [35] [36] [37] [38] .
From a neurobiological perspective, this statistical carving (factorisation) corresponds to functional segregation [1, 28] . If correct, this means that conditionally independent causes of our sensations correspond to the attributes that define functional specialisation; for example, motion, colour, form and so on [39] . In other words, natural selection, epigenetics and experience-dependent plasticity equip the brain with the right sort of mean field approximation to infer the factors causing sensations. For example, knowing an object's colour does not (generically) determine its motion and so on. One could pursue this approach right down to the level of classical receptive fields [38, 40] and their contextual modulation (extra classical receptive field effects) implied by the multiplication of marginal distributions to form precise posterior (probabilistic) beliefs. However, here, we want to consider another potentially more fundamental carving of statistical independencies that speaks, not to what and where streams but to what and when systems -a dissection that may provide organising principles for the brains of higher animals.
What and when -functional segregation of the neocortex and hippocampus
It is almost self-evident that the most pervasive and simplest conditional independence -that we deal with at all the time in perceptual synthesis and spatial navigation -is the temporal or ordinal succession of events [41] . Here, succession per se can be separated from the constituent events. In other words, the very concepts of "first", "last", "quick" and "fast" . This may explain why the hippocampus is a hub with far-reaching connectivity [44] ; as opposed to more modular neocortical areas. This connectivity places the hippocampus and paralimbic cortex at the centre of (centrifugal) hierarchical cortical connectivity [45, 46] .
Physiological support for model predictions
If temporal succession or ordinal structure is a (conditionally) independent statistical construct, one would expect to see sequential dynamics encoded by hippocampal neurons that are not bound to their content [47] . Self-generated sequences of neuronal firing patterns have been reported in the hippocampus [48] , prefrontal cortex [49] and parietal cortex [50] . Thus, it appears that the brain is genetically equipped with neuronal architectures that encode canonical or preconfigured sequences, prior to those sequences being associated or imbued with (bound to) any particular content [51] . This provides a somewhat counterintuitive prediction that one should see sequential dynamics prior to any particular experience, in systems like the hippocampus [51] . This fits comfortably with recent observations that the neurons showing the greatest (sequential) firing rate modulations are impervious to the particular sequence of events experienced in the recent past [52] . Furthermore, experience with multiple sequences with different content, may be expected to engage the same canonical sequences, in the same way that the encoding of a spatial target in terms of its location is independent of its attributes [53] .
These predictions also fit heuristically with the notion of fast firing units ('choristers') providing a canonical tempo for temporal succession, while slow firing neurons ('soloists') provide a context-specific content that may mediate the (plastic and context-sensitive) mapping to extra-hippocampal representations [54] . This perspective also explains the emergence of multiple place cells in the sequential encoding the pure attributes of temporal succession; i.e., the temporal order or sequence [55] . See [56] and [57] for compelling treatments of context in the Bayesian setting. In short, the picture that emerges here is of a neuronal representation of temporal succession that adumbrates any particular sequence, such that content-free sequences are associated with a particular content -through the use of auxiliary units that show a greater plasticity and context-sensitivity [58] .
The statistics of neuronal encoding
An interesting aspect of a mean field approximation is that marginal probabilities have to be multiplied to generate joint distributions or distributions over outcomes. Indeed, in statistics, a ubiquitous scheme for evaluating marginal distributions -known as belief propagation -is also called sum-product message passing. This is important because the realization of the product of independent positive random variables is a lognormal process (this follows from the central limit theorem in the log domain). The implication for the statistics of neuronal encoding is that we might expect to see lognormal distributions of synaptic strengths, firing rates and burst probabilities -under the assumption that spiking encodes the probability or expectation of occupying hidden states [18] .
Predictions of the 'what and when' distinction -the remembered present
There is something quite distinct about representations with and without factorisation over Put simply, the first word in it sentence is always the same word before or after reading it. This means that sequential (when) states do all the heavy lifting incurred by temporal succession, endowing contextual (what) representations with a form of translational invariance, not in space but over time. Effectively, this converts a sequence of representations into the representation of a sequence. Heuristically, this means the representation of a narrative, trajectory or sequence of states is no longer tied to the present; enabling -or indeed mandating -an explicit representation of the past (i.e. memory) and future [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] . This intuition might explain why brain structures associated with memory are also implicated in planning [64] [65] [66] . This fits comfortably with the fact that mental travel into the past and future engages the same anatomical substrates and algorithms deployed for spatial navigation in the present [67] [68] [69] [70] .
In short, the factorisation into what and when necessarily entails a working memory that can accommodate postdiction and prediction. In this setting, postdiction corresponds to the accumulation of evidence for any particular content (sequence); namely, updating beliefs about the past -and, simultaneously, predictions about the future. For example, this predicts that there are neuronal populations in the brain that encode the current sentence, in a way that necessarily predicts its conclusion. This representation changes much more slowly than the (e.g., predictive coding) processing of graphemes and word forms that are engaged by saccadic eye movements [71] [72] [73] . In this sense, carving the world into canonical sequencesand the context under which those sequences unfold -provides a deep and hierarchical representation of time, as exemplified by the nested nature of the multitude of brain rhythms [74] . See also [75, 76] . See Figure 1 for simulated hippocampal responses during saccadic eye movements, under a mean field assumption. One could argue that we are simply putting a Bayesian gloss on the fact that the hippocampus encodes sequences of events. However, our proposition is somewhat simpler and subtler: the hippocampus -in contrast to other organs of succession such as the basal ganglia and cerebellum -has a privileged role; it encodes the very essence of sequences, without reference to particular events. The content of the sequence depends on how events are 'bound' to content-free sequences, through context-sensitive and activity-dependent changes in synaptic efficacy. If this view is right, one would expect to see intrinsic (sequential) dynamics in hippocampal activity, even "in the absence of any external memory demand or spatiotemporal boundary" [82] -a prediction that is now attracting empirical attention [47, 82] . The broader empirical implication presents an avenue for falsifying the mean field hypothesis (see also [85] ); namely, if a subset of hippocampal neurons encode the marginal probability of where they are in a sequence, one should be able to identify cells that are 'repurposed' for trajectories (e.g., in linear mazes) that insensitive to the particular environment or direction of travel. In other words, they should show a context-invariance that speaks to conditional independence.
Concluding remarks -Active inference and narratives
Many interesting predictions follow from this perspective. For example, place cell activity is typically identified by correlating neuronal responses with the current location of an animal.
However, if the hippocampus encodes both time (when) and space (what), the activity of cells encoding the first and subsequent places visited should accumulate evidence over the duration of the sequence. This means one should be able to find neurons whose activity is predicted not by the current location but by where the animal started -and where it is going.
A second interesting corollary of this perspective on mnemonic representation of sequences is that beliefs about the future are tied to beliefs about the past. If we act upon these beliefs, then we create a (non-Markovian, i.e., history-dependent) world with rich temporal structure.
This follows because, in the absence of any action of the brain on the world, the succession of worldly states can be predicted completely by the laws of nature (e.g., Hamilton's principle of least action, classical mechanics, and so on). Crucially, these laws are compatible with a Markovian world in which the next state depends only on the previous state. However, if we now put mnemonic agents into the mix -whose action depends upon the past -the world becomes much more interesting. Indeed, hippocampal firing sequences continue to evolve even in the absence of continuous sensory inputs [47] . In short, the way we represent temporal succession and the implicit narratives that predict and explain our senses leads inevitably to behaviour that transcends the rules of classical physics.
Box 1: approximate Bayesian inference
Bayesian inference refers to optimising beliefs about a model or its hidden states (s) in the light of outcomes (o) or evidence. Formally, this can be expressed as minimising a variational free energy bound on Bayesian model evidence [86] , with respect to beliefs about hidden states encoded by a probability density () Qs (with expectation: Here, the model is specified by a joint distribution over outcomes and their causes or hidden
The first expression for free energy shows that when free energy is minimised, the relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence attains its minimum (zero) and free energy becomes the negative logarithm of model evidence. In other words, when free energy is minimised, the approximate posterior beliefs become the true posterior beliefs (i.e., the distribution of hidden states given outcomes) and free energy becomes negative log evidence.
Another way of conceptualizing free energy is in terms of accuracy and complexity -as shown in the second equality. This equality shows that minimising free energy minimises complexity. Here, complexity is the KL divergence between posterior beliefs and prior beliefs (prior to any outcomes). In other words, complexity reflects the degrees of freedomabove and beyond prior beliefs -needed to provide an accurate account of observed data. It is easy to show that when one is absolutely certain about the hidden states causing data, the complexity increases with the number of hidden states entertained by the model. The imperative to minimise complexity is known as Occam's principle and is the basis of approximations to model evidence provided by the Akaike and Bayesian information criteria [87] . The role of complexity will become important later, when we consider models with a large number of states encoding joint distributions over two factors, relative to parsimonious models (with greater model evidence) that just encode the factors or marginal densities (see Box 2) . In terms of the equations above, this distinction can be expressed as the mean field approximation ( ) ( So which is the better model? If observations are generated by a world in which objects are invariant, then the mean field approximation provides an accurate explanation for observed outcomes with the least complexity. This is because there are fewer hidden states (or degrees of freedom) than in the joint representation. Because the same accuracy is obtained with a lower complexity, this model will have more evidence and will be selected during natural (Bayesian model) selection (see Box 1) . Conversely, in a magical or ambiguous world -in which the identity of a moving object can change instantaneously -the joint model will be necessary to generate accurate predictions. For example, an instantaneous switch from 'H' to 'T' after the first observation cannot be modelled under the mean field approximation (indicated by the red arrow). In this magical world, the joint model will justify its extra complexity by providing more accurate explanations for observations. However, in a real world, it is overly complex -with a redundant or inefficient parameterisation [35] . field assumption. These data report simulations of saccadic eye movements during reading, using the scheme described in [88] . In brief, we simulated saccadic eye movements sampling four successive 'words', under the hypotheses that the words were generated by one of six to take from these simulated neuronal responses is that they possess many features of empirical activity; for example, there is a natural theta-gamma coupling [89] [90] [91] due to fast (gamma) activity elicited by each cue that is sampled at a slower (theta) frequency (lower left panels). One can also see a characteristic phase precession [92] as predictions about the future are confirmed by sensory evidence. These simulations can be reproduced with the DEM toolbox, available from http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm.
Glossary of (Bayesian) terms
Bayesian belief updating: the combination of prior beliefs about the causes of an observation and the likelihood of that observation to produce a posterior belief about its hidden causes. This updating conforms to Bayes rule.
Likelihood: the probability of an observation under a generative model, given its causes.
Prior belief: a probability distribution over the hidden causes of observations, before they are observed.
Posterior beliefs: a probability distribution over the hidden causes of observed consequences, after they are observed.
Hidden causes or states: the unobserved (possibly fictive) causes of observed data
Generative model: a probabilistic specification of the dependencies among causes and consequences; usually specified in terms of a prior belief and the likelihood of observations, given their causes.
Expectation: the mean or average (the first order moment of a probability distribution).
Approximate Bayesian inference:
Bayesian belief updating in which approximate posterior distributions are optimized by minimizing variational free energy. The approximate posterior convergences to the true posterior when free energy is minimized.
Variational free energy: a functional of a probability distribution (and observations) that upper bounds (is always greater than) the negative log evidence for a generative model. This negative log evidence is also known as surprise or self information in information theory.
Bayesian model evidence: this is the probability that some observations were generated by a model.
It is also known as the marginal or integrated likelihood because it does not depend upon the hidden causes.
Complexity: the difference or divergence between prior and posterior beliefs. The complexity of a model reflects the change in prior beliefs produced by Bayesian belief updating (also known as Bayesian surprise)
